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Commentary by Experts
DOUGLASS CASSEL:
¶1
¶2

Thank you very much, Ambassador Williamson.
Professor Jan Wouters of Leuven University will now take over as moderator and
our three independent experts will come to the head table.
JAN WOUTERS :*

¶3

¶4

Ladies and gentlemen, after the thoughtful interventio ns by UN Ambassadors, we
now turn to the experts, by which the organizers do not mean to imply at all that there is
any lack of expertise with the members of our first panel, but rather that this panel is
composed of scholars, fellows and professors who are not representing a state. We are
looking forward to interesting commentaries by these experts.
It is my pleasure to first give the floor to Lee Feinstein, who is senior fellow in US
foreign policy and international law and deputy director of studies at the Council on
Foreign Relations.
LEE F EINSTEIN :**

¶5

Thank you very much. I expect I am one of the offenders Sir David referred to in
his remarks, impugning to the report ideas not intended by some of its members. For
that, I apologize in advance.

*

Professor Jan Wouters teaches public international law and the law of international organizations at the
Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium, and European banking and securities law at Maastricht University
in The Netherlands. Professor Wouters currently serves as the Director of the Institute for International
Law at the Catholic University of Leuven, and as of counsel to the Brussels law firm of De Bandt, van
Hecke, Lagae & Loesch (Linklaters & Alliance). He has written extensively on international and EC law
(including a book on the Maastricht Treaty which he co-authored with Professor Wouter Devroe), and on
national, comparative and European company and financial law. He has served as legal secretary to the
European Court of Justice in Luxembourg (1991-1994) and as legal adviser to the Belgian Minister of
Finance (1989). Professor Wouters graduated from Antwerp University with a law degree in 1987,
obtained his Master of Laws (LL.M.) degree from Yale University in 1990, and was a Visiting Researcher
(1990-1991) at Harvard Law School before obtaining his Ph.D. in Law from the Catholic University of
Leuven in 1996.
**
Lee Feinstein is Senior Fellow in US Foreign Policy, and Deputy Director of Studies of the Council
on Foreign Relations. An expert on national security policy, weapons of mass destruction, diplomatic
issues, and international law, he was Project Director of the Council’s independent task force on
“Enhancing US Leadership at the UN.” Mr. Feinstein is the former principal deputy director of the US
Department of State’s policy planning staff, and a senior advisor to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.
He led the US delegation to the UN special negotiations on trafficking in firearms, and coordinated overall
US diplomatic efforts in this area. He also worked on peacekeeping policy in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense from 1994 to 1995. Before joining the Clinton administration in February 1994, he was assistant
director of the private Arms Control Association in Washington, DC. Mr. Feinstein received a J.D. degree
from the Georgetown University Law Center and an M.A. in political science from the City University of
New York. He has taught international law and politics as an adjunct professor at George Washington
University’s Elliott School of International Affairs and the City University of New York.
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This is the right city in which to address these issues. Arguably, the contemporary
debate about humanitarian intervention was launched in Chicago in 1999 by British
Prime Minister Tony Blair in a seminal speech to the Chicago Economic Council. 1 In
that speech he outlined a doctrine which was the basis for what has come to be known as
the “Responsibility to Protect,” a concept subsequently adopted by the High- Level Panel
on Threats, Challenges, and Change, which is the subject of our discussion today.
¶7
The High- Level Panel Report is very much in keeping with long-standing US legal
policy. It endorses US legal positions on such questions as the inherent right of selfdefense, the flexibility in interpreting threats to international peace and security under
Article 38 of the UN Charter, and even on what constitutes terrorism. Moreover, the
Panel’s themes echo those sounded by the Bush Administration in its National Security
Strategy about the nature of the dangers facing the United States and the world today.
The report’s recommendations are also consistent with giving greater overall
responsibility for global affairs to the Security Council relative to the General Assembly,
a position which ought to be welcomed in Washington.
¶8
Beyond that, the report is extremely important in terms of the development of
international law. The significance of the report’s findings are amplified by the range of
international figures that served on the Panel, including the serving Secretary-General of
the Arab League, former foreign ministers of China and Russia, and America’s most
esteemed realist, Brent Scowcroft.
¶9
Over time this report will be seen as a watershed in international law. It will mark
a shift from the era of the traditional concept of sovereignty to an era of conditional
sovereignty. By traditional sovereignty, I refer to such ideas as the formal equality of
states and the monopoly of force within borders. This is an audience of international
lawyers, so there is no need to review all of the formal elements of sovereignty.
¶10
I would simply add that the importance of the formal equality of states grew in the
period between the end of the Cold War until the mid-1990s. This had a significant
impact on international politics and negotiations at the time, when fairness in the
international system was widely equated with the principles of universality and “one
country, one vote.” In the face of the genocides of the 1990s and later the Security
Council rupture over Iraq, the older ideas about sovereignty began to yield to newer
ideas, in which a state’s sovereign rights are a function of its behavior. The High- Level
Panel speaks to these issues very eloquently, even if some of its members may disown
these points.
¶11
The first principle of conditional sovereignty is the idea that sovereignty entails
rights as well as responsibilities. A government’s first sovereign responsibility is to its
people, to protect them from grave harm, atrocities, and crimes against humanity. If a
state fails to live up to this primary responsibility, through acts of omission or
commission, it cannot expect to enjoy the full benefits of sovereignty. The corollary
principle is that when a state fails to live up to this fundamental responsibility, other
states have a duty to take action to spotlight, preve nt, or stop the oppression. By action I
mean everything from diplomacy to economic pressure and, if necessary, the prompt use
of force.

1

Tony Blair, British Prime Minister, Address at the Chicago Economic Club (Apr. 22, 1999), available
at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/jan-june99/blair_doctrine4-23.html.
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The idea of conditional or “differentiated” sovereignty is already embedded in the
UN Charter and throughout the UN system. The UN Charter, for example, makes
distinctions among and between countries. The clearest example is the granting of
permanent Security Council seats and vetoes to the victors of World War II. There are
many other examples, as well.
Beyond the UN Charter, many international agreements make similar distinctions.
The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, for example, legalizes the possession of
nuclear weapons, at least for a period of time, for five states which exploded nuclear
devices before the Treaty was signed, while permanently outlawing the nuclear weapons
option for all other nations. By the mid-1990s, however, it became increasingly difficult
to negotiate such double standards. Washington first experienced this when it was unable
to set the terms of the negotiations on the Ottawa Treaty banning the use and possession
of anti-personnel land mines. During the same period the United States unsuccessfully
sought special rights for itself and the other members of the Security Council in the Ro me
Treaty, which established the International Criminal Court. Other nations,
understandably, demanded equal treatment for all parties to the treaty in the name of
universality and fairness.
The pendulum began to swing in the other direction as a result of the experiences of
the past fifteen years: the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia; the failure of the Security
Council to authorize action to avert killings in Kosovo; and the rupture of Iraq in 2003.
Throughout the 1990s, sovereignty was being redefined in an effort to deal with
new threats and challenges. The Charter’s phrase “threat to international peace and
security” was invoked repeatedly during the 1990s to give legal justification to a range of
interventions, establishing examples of state practice that would redefine state
sovereignty.
In 1992, for example, state incapacity was determined by the Security Council to be
a threat to international peace and security warranting the use of force in Somalia. Later,
in the case of Haiti, it was the interruption of an “established democracy,” which was
cited in authorizing an intervention to restore the Aristide government.
Security Council resolutions approved after the Kosovo intervention gave after-thefact legal standing to NATO military action to prevent atrocities. Even after the US-led
invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Security Council passed a series of resolutions, most of them
unanimously, that gave formal legal standing to the occupation forces and their role in
supporting the transition to self- rule.
Statements of leading international figures and scholars have also contributed to the
development and broader acceptance of the concept of conditional sovereignty. Tony
Blair’s speech was a watershed. He was the first world leader to set forth factors that
would warrant humanitarian intervention. He specifically addressed the need to act, even
if the Security Council could not or would not, as was the case in Kosovo. 2 In June 2000,
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan gave an important speech in Warsaw at the founding
of the Community of Democracies. Annan talked about the importance of democracy as
an essential component of what it means to be a member of the United Nations. 3 In 2001,
Gareth Evans and Mohammed Sahnoun coined the phrase “Responsibility to Protect.”4
2

Id.
Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary-General, UN Secretary -General Kofi Annan’s Closing Remarks
to the Ministerial (June 27, 2000), available at
3
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In 2003, Annan announced his intention to establish a commission to review
challenges to the UN’s effectiveness. 5 That became the High- Level Panel, which issued
its report in December 2004.
Having discussed the importance of the Panel’s work, let me briefly identify the
shortcomings of an otherwise excellent report. The report does not – not surprisingly
given the Panel’s composition – address the issue of who decides whether or if to use
force if the Security Council is deadlocked.
It also does not extend the principles supporting humanitarian intervention to
proliferation issues, and I believe it must. The Responsibility to Protect implies a “Duty
to Prevent.”6 This is the principle that closed societies pursuing weapons of mass
destruction pose an especially grave danger, giving rise to a responsibility on the part of
the international community to act early and collectively, not necessarily by force, to
prevent them from going down the nuclear road. 7
The report’s recommendations regarding the Human Rights Commission were
weak. The Panel recommended that membership on the Human Rights Commission
should be universal. That would only compound the Commission’s existing credibility
problem.
Finally, the report pays insufficient attention to the importance of democracy
within countries, as a hallmark of good international citizenship.
JAN WOUTERS :

¶24

We will pass the floor to Ian Hurd.
IAN HURD :***

¶25

I as well want to thank you, all of the organizers from all of the organizations, and
thank also the distinguished guests. It is an honor to be here, learning from you all.
¶26
I want to pick up on the theme of collective security that has been mentioned by a
number of speakers and make what I guess ends up being a rather small point, but one

http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/un_secertary_gen_kofi_annan.pdf.
4
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT (2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/.
5
Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, United Nations, Address to the General Assembly (Sept. 23, 2003),
available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/sg2eng030923.
6
Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, FOREIGN A FFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at
136-50.
7
Id.
***
Professor Ian Hurd is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Northwestern
University. In addition to articles on a range of international affairs issues, Professor Hurd is the author of
Legitimacy and Power in International Relations: Theory and Practice at the UN Security Council, a
manuscript currently under review. Professor Hurd was awarded the Farrell Award for Excellence in
Undergraduate Teaching, Northwestern University Department of Political Science 2003-04 and the Searle
Center for Teaching Excellence, Fellowship for 2003-04. He earned his Bachelor of Arts in Political
Science, with highest honors, and the University Medal for Social Science form Carleton University in
Ottawa, Canada. Professor Hurd received a Master of Arts, Master of Philosophy, and Ph.D. from Yale
University. His Ph.D. examination fields were International Relations, with distinction, Political Economy,
with distinction, and Political Theory. His earned his PhD for a dissertation titled “Legitimacy, Authority,
and Power at the UN Security Council.”
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that I think has implications that need to be made clear here about the Security Council as
a collective security organization. I would like to begin by going back to 1945 and then
moving forwards to what I think is a tension in many people’s interpretation of the
Council between the actual law of the Charter and some states’ expectations about what
the Council’s authority should be.
We could put this in a number of ways. We could categorize it as a tension
between the preamble of the Charter and most of its operative paragraphs, or a tension
between realism and idealism (but not in the traditional IR sense in those terms of art), or
an as distinction between law and aspiration.
I want to pose this as a tension between a great power compact and a collective
security system and use this to argue that many people’s expectations for collective
security in the Council far outstrip the actual institutionalization of that mechanism.
How this came to be is an interesting topic for academics. We are always looking
for cases where practice goes one way and the law goes the other way and then you have
this odd relationship between the two.
I think that is intriguing but in practical terms the tension is very important because
it is the hidden source of a lot of misunderstandings and misplaced critiquing of the
Council, not least over the Iraq war in 2003, but also underlying misplaced disagreement
over Council reform and about the Council’s more general relationship to human rights
and to international security.
So this tension between great power compact and collective security. If you go
back to 1945 and you consider the deliberations really between the great powers and the
rest, which is essentially what San Francisco turns out to be, you see the great powers
working very, very hard to create a security system in which all collective security
obligations are subordinate to the veto.
This is what was negotiated before San Francisco and this is the recurring theme of
negotiations between the great powers and everybody else in San Francisco.
Small states proposed at San Francisco different kinds of ways of reducing the veto
or making certain kinds of decisions not subject to the veto and at every point the great
powers, sometimes after machinations behind the scenes, came out collectively with one
voice and succeeded in defeating any reductions in the veto.
What the great powers thought they were making in San Francisco was a great
power compact: a bargain among themselves with an institution attached to it about how
they would run the international system, and specifically at what point in their
deliberations over the international system could either the small states have a voice or
could the opposition of one of the great powers be enough to kill the collective plan.
This is a concert of great powers, a great power compact.
In the Charter, all of the collective obligations on security are placed under the veto
so that collective action is possible by the Council but always contingent on the five
agreeing.
There is no automatic institutional mechanism for making collective obligations.
There are only mechanisms making collective obligations by the explicit consent of the
great powers. This was designed to reduce the chance of conflict among the great
powers, and this is the ultimate goal of a compact: to manage international problems so
that the possibility of war between the great powers is minimized.
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What you have in the Charter reflects this intention. It reflects an adamant
opposition to creating a collective security institution.
The absence of collective security in the Charter was not an accident. It was the
point of the veto. It is why the veto was important, and in that sense it might be why the
Council was important to the whole UN. That was the purpose of the whole Council: to
manage relations between the great powers with the legitimizing device of having
representatives of the rest present.
The expectation that has developed in many circles is that the Council is the center
of a collective security apparatus. Collective security requires two things. It requires the
principle of all versus one. And it requires an automatic institutional mechanism for
making that work. It must therefore apply to everybody equally. A collective security
where they can opt out is not collective security, it is something else.
A real collective security system would have imposed some kind of obligations on
the great powers. As it stands now, if the Council fails to pass a resolution, it is hard to
see in the Charter any collective obligations on permanent members.
Those who cling to the expectation that the Security Council will implement
collective security have a much more expansive view of the Council’s authority, original
purpose, and operation than is reflected in the Charter.
This is important for understanding the Iraq War debates because a lot of
commentary about how the Council performed relative to the Iraq War is premised on
this more ambitious way of thinking. This is true not just among the critics of the
American action but amo ng many of its defenders.
On both sides you see a shared commitment to the idea that the Council is the
linchpin of collective security and that there should be some Council obligations on great
powers. The critics of the US argue that the war was illegal because it was not authorized
by the Council. Many states took the view that they would support the invasion if it had
been authorized by the Council. This puts priority on the procedure of the Council over
the substance of the debate.
Similarly, among the defenders of the war you get the same kind of spirit, those
who say that the Council failed because it did not enforce its resolutions by authorizing
the US action or failed because it simply did not realize the realities of power as
distributed in the system are taking the same kind of view. They see the function of the
Council as enacting the collective security principle which might well be a nice thing to
do but it is not what is in the Charter.
The distinction is important, I think, for a number of reasons.
First, it matters for how you interpret the existence of disagreement in the Council.
The collective security view sees disagreement in the Council as a problem that needs to
be solved or as an obstacle to the smooth functioning of the Council; in other words, a
sign of failure.
The concert view sees great power disagreement as the main reason for having the
Council in the first place. The Council was an institution in which great power
disagreements could be aired and where great powers could stop collective action
whenever they wanted to. (I am treating here the permanent five as each a great power.
This convenience masks significant problems, both now and in 1945, which we could
talk about.) The concert view sees disagreement among the great powers in the Council
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as normal politics. This is what happens in international politics and is proving the need
for the Council itself rather than as an aberration or a problem.
The second reason that is it important not to mistake the Council for a collective
security system is that you get a different sense of what is a success and what is a failure
of the Council. Inaction is not necessarily a failure of the Council. It may be the Council
operating exactly as intended. We can have success and failure on substantive problems,
so a failure to resolve a particular crisis may be of concern to us.
But, I think that needs to be kept distinct from our assessment of success and
failure of the Council in its operation as designed in the Charter. In other words, we need
to lower our expectations to accurately recognize the powers and limits of the Council.
And most generally then, this affects how you think about what to expect.
We cannot expect the Council to regulate the great powers. That is the key
difference between the collective security and the compact images of the Council; when
the matter is pushed to its limit, the Council does not regulate great powers. It is instead
a hierarchical security system that binds the small states, but only binds the great powers
when they consent. It is fundamentally unequal.
In thinking about the High- Level Panel Report, there is nothing in there that would
change this basic structure. That is neither praise nor criticism, but it is worth noting that
the ability to protect remains subordinate to the veto and therefore to the great power
compact nature of the whole operation.
So what are we to make then of the behavior of a number of states and the writing
of a number of publicists who subscribe to this grander but mistaken expectation of what
the council is for? They may be legally unfounded but the Iraq episode shows that they
are quite widespread in the system. For that reason their influence must be taken into
account when assessing the role of the Council. Some of the more famous critics of the
Council over Iraq suggested that the Council failed because it did not support the US
action and therefore, that the Council demonstrated its irrelevance.
I do not want to be mistaken to be saying that the Council is irrelevant because it is
not legally binding on great powers. The latter is true, but the former is not. The Iraq
episode demonstrated the degree to which a number of states are willing to act on these
legally unfounded expectations for collective security. The smart hegemon, the prudent
great power, needs to take into account these higher expectations because they will affect
how other states react to hegemonic behavior. This is an informal kind of power. It may
be an indirect route by which you get to the legally unfounded higher expectations. It is
not part of the Charter but it is part of practice.
So where do we go from here? I suggest two possible paths.
First, we could decide that we really do want collective security and we are willing
to make new international organizations to enact it. This would not be an evolution of
the Council; it would be directly counter to what the Council has always been. We may
well still want to do it. It would be instructive of course to remember the history of
negotiating the Charter in order to appreciate the difficulties in taking that path.
The other way to go is simply accept what the Charter has created and lower our
expectations about what the Council is for. This does not mean abandoning the effort to
use the Council to influence great powers but it does mean thinking more about indirect
ways of doing so.
So I am not suggesting that this is in any sense a critique of the Council.
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Rather, if we are interested in a rules-based system, we should pay serious attention
to what the rules actually are. What are the legal obligations on the great powers in the
Charter? We might be able to rescue the Council from some unrealistic expectations and,
therefore, from some unfounded criticism.
¶60
And it gives us a new appreciation, I think, for the informal legitimizing power of
these norms percolating below the surface. Thanks.
JAN WOUTERS :
¶61

Ladies and gentlemen, we had interesting reflections and comments from an
international law from the political science perspective.
¶62
We are looking forward to the comments of our third panel member, Joshua
Muravchik, who is the resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and whose
recent essay in the case against the United Nations has not gone unnoticed.
JOSHUA MURAVCHIK :****
¶63
¶64

¶65

¶66

¶67

¶68

Thank you very much.
First, especially I would like to express my thanks to Doug Cassel and his assistant
Dhana-Marie Branton and the others. I found this to be as well and carefully prepared a
conference as I have participated in in some time and it makes it a special pleasure to be
here.
I want to, however, take exception to one point in Doug’s setting of the framework
this morning. The intellectual framework for our discourse in which he said we are
meeting at a time of America’s maximum power. I find that unduly pessimistic.
I think that the High- Level Panel deserves to be saluted for facing up to several of
the troubling aspects of the record of the UN and I am going to talk about four in
particular.
The first is the UN’s rather notorious bureaucratic inefficiency. This is present in
more subtle statements in the section of the report that deals with the Secretariat. When
briefing the press, Panel members, without allowing their names to be used, referred to
deadwood as a problem for the UN, and the report contains a proposal for a one-time
buy-out of the contracts or tenure of this deadwood.
The second area to which the report faced up boldly was the record of the
Commission on Human Rights, which it said has become an embarrassment to the UN,
which is amply true. The Commission on Human Rights, as the report noted without
****

Joshua Muravchik is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research. In addition to his recent commentary, The Case Against the UN, his study on the UN will be
published by AEI Press in 2005. An expert on the Bush Doctrine, Mr. Muravchik is the author of, among
other books, The Imperative of American Leadership. He also writes on neoconservatism, the history of
socialism and communism, the Arab-Israeli conflict, global democracy and terrorism. Mr. Muravchik
received his B.A from City College of New York and his Ph.D. in International Relations from Georgetown
University. He has been Adjunct professor at the Institute of World Politics since 1992, and Adjunct
Scholar at the Washington Institute on Near East Policy since 1986. From 1985 to 1997 he was a member
of the Maryland State Advisory Committee of the US Commission on Civil Rights. In 1992, he was a
member of the Commission on Broadcasting to the People's Republic of China. From 1977 to 1979, he
was executive director of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority. Mr. Muravchik is an editorial board
member of World Affairs and Journal of Democracy.
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giving detail, is often filled with members who are that government’s most abusive of
human rights.
The Freedom House in its annual survey of freedom provides a side bar that it calls
the “worst of the worst.” It lists the countries that get the worst possible score for
freedom on both of the two scales that Freedom House uses, and there are anywhere
from, oh, seven to ten countries out of the 192 in the world with this worst possible
rating. Each year, several and as many as half of these “worst of the worst” secure seats
for themselves on the Human Rights Commission, and therefore, never come in for
criticism.
And it goes beyond that in the sense of the way regional caucuses function in the
kind of mutual back-scratching game so that, as Ambassador Williamson mentioned,
even this year we were unable to get an unambiguous resolution on Darfur through the
Human Rights Commission. We are not talking about the Security Council or someone
having to send troops to do something about it. We are talking merely of a symbolic
recognition of the humanitarian tragedy in crimes going on there, and this was defeated in
the Human Rights Commission.
Worst of all, every year for the past several years, the UN Human Rights
Commission has adopted a resolution endorsing terrorism as an expression of fulfillment
of the purposes of the United Nations.
The third area in which the High- Level Panel has faced up to some of the UN’s
failures is in calling for an unambiguous resolution against terrorism. The language that
was proposed by the Panel is that terrorism must be condemned clearly and
unequivocally. This is a break with forty years of tradition in which the UN has refused
to condemn terrorism and indeed has encouraged it and endorsed it, and this proposed
language deserves a round of applause.
Fourth, and most importantly, the report contains the surprisingly blunt criticism,
including a surprisingly blunt phrase criticizing “an unwillingness to get serious about
preventing deadly violence,”8 and this underbids its discussion of possible reforms of the
Security Council.
Having tipped my hat to the Panel for facing up to these four important areas of UN
failure, I must go on to say, however, that I am underwhelmed by the solutions that it
suggests.
In the first, about the bureaucratic insufficiency. It may be possible to pension off
the current supply of deadwood in the UN bureaucracy but that deadwood did not
descend miraculously from the sky. It came from somewhere, and there is nothing in
here to prevent what will inevitably happen, which is that it will be replaced by a new
generation of deadwood. It is not just that the UN had the bad fortune of having to hire a
whole bunch of deadbeats; there is something wrong in the system that creates this
deadwood. What is wrong? I think, essentially, there are two things.
One is the world’s most elaborate and grotesque system of affirmative action in
which people are hired for posts in the UN in large measure based on what countries or
regions they come from rather than on their individual qualification. Second, the entire
bureaucracy, the entire structure of the UN Secretariat, lacks transparency and lacks
accountability, because the UN functions as a kind of proto-world government.
8

High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
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It is a government made up of governments. Some of those governments, a fair
number, are not democratic governments so there is no popular contingency to which
they are answerable. But, even in the case of democratic governments, the UN is so far
removed from the publics of the democratic countries that there is almost an impossibility
of public scrutiny of what goes on in the UN.
Do you know how your UN representatives voted this past year? I bet not very
many know very much about that.
The second area is on the Commission on Human Rights. The proposal that has
been offered, as Lee Feinstein noted, is to go from the current commission to a
commission of universal membership.
Universal membership means, in effect, the makeup the General Assembly. The
Commission on Human Rights could be expanded to include representatives from all
member states, or the responsibilities of the Commission on Human Rights could be
dropped into the General Assembly. However, elsewhere in the report, you will notice a
rather frank admission by the Panel that the General Assembly is itself completely
dysfunctional and no longer provides any useful forum.
The Panel was very short on suggestions about what to do to improve the General
Assembly. It had one suggestion, which was to shorten the agenda, which is readily
apparent and cuts in exactly the opposite direction of fobbing the responsibilities of the
Commission on Human Rights into the General Assembly.
The second disquieting thing about this proposal of universal membership is
perhaps the most disgraceful episode in regard to human rights, which was the so-called
World Conference Against Racism in Durban a couple of years ago, which turned into a
kind of forum. This World Conference Against Racism was based upon principles of
universal membership.
The third area is the area of anti-terrorism, and on this I am less critical; it would
really be a big improvement if the language suggested by the commission is, in fact,
adopted by the UN. As some of you know, the General Assembly about seven years ago
set and trained a deliberation for the adoption of a general convention against terrorism,
and it has been blocked for seven years.
It is blocked because of the veto persistently exercised by the Organization of the
Islamic Conference. The position of the Organization of the Islamic Conference is “we
must first define terrorism,” and their argument is that terrorism must be defined by who
does it and why, rather than by the nature of the act. The position of the OIC is that
terrorism undertaken on behalf of bad causes is bad, but terrorism undertaken on behalf
of good causes is good, and it would not accept any convention that did not acknowledge
that principle. I think that if the support of Amre Moussa, the General Secretary of the
Arab League, suggests that the OIC will now reverse itself, this will be a very useful step
forward.
The fourth area is the most important, and that is on willingness to get serious
about the use of deadly force. I think this is the area in which the High- Level Panel has
failed most egregiously because what it gives us, it itself fails to get serious about facing
up to – about preventing deadly violence.
Its first proposal is to enlarge the Security Council but the principal failure of the
UN to get serious about deadly violence is the paralysis of the Security Council. And
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enlarging the Security Council, whether you do it by an Option A or Option B, is a
formula for more paralysis.
Second, it goes out of its way to try to undermine the hopeful development of
recent years in the world about people being more willing to take seriously the danger of
deadly violence. That is the recent willingness of NATO to see itself play a larger role
than a narrow self-defense role, to see itself being willing to undertake missions in
defense of the peace outside of the territorial area of the NATO member states. Yet, the
High-Level Panel goes out of its way to take a swipe at NATO for doing this and to
reassert the authority of the Security Council over any NATO activities.
And finally, there is the insistence of the Panel that Article 51 is sacrosanct and
must not be changed in any way, Article 51 being the article about self-defense.
I think this goes really to the heart of the problem of the UN and the failure of the
Panel to get to that, which is that the UN itself is a kind of social contract roughly
analogous to the lock- in idea of the social contract in which in a society and individuals
willingly sacrifice some degree of their own autonomy to act in defense of themselves
and on behalf of their own interests. They yield that essential authority to a government
in exchange for receiving a set of protections that makes their lives more safe and
comfortable.
The UN rests on an analo gous social contract in which the states give up some
measure of their previously enjoyed autonomy of action to act in defense of themselves
or their interest. They give that up in the interest of the overall structure of peace that the
UN was intended to create. They give that up because this structure of peace gives them
back something of equal or greater worth, that is, something that will ensure their security
or work toward ensuring their security.
The problem is this structure of peace has never come into existence. It is a dead
letter. It has been a dead letter from day one, and it is therefore impossible or illogical
under the law to say that the states should still regard themselves as having made this
sacrifice of autonomy in exchange for nothing. The nothingness of this nothing is
underscored inadvertently by the High-Level Panel itself which says, on the whole, “We
do not think the Charter should be changed in many places but we have one change:
delete Article 47.”
Article 47 is the linchpin of the entire structure of peace and security that is
embedded in the Charter in Chapter VII. Article 47 creates the military general staff that
will, in turn, command the UN military forces that are supposed to provide this security.
Acknowledging that this is all a fiction, the Panel says, “We might as well delete
Article 47,” but it puts nothing in its place. The reality is that in the history of the UN, it
has fulfilled this goal of responding to a threat to peace by action of the Security Council
or to a breach of the peace, rather, two times: in Korea in 1950 and in Kuwait in 1990 and
1991.
And on both of these occasions, the Security Council did not go through the
motions of acting through the procedures set out in the Charter for responses by the UN
to threats of the peace, but rather it acted under Article 51. That is, it called on the United
States and its friends to undertake an action of collective self-defense. So, to make a
stand in defense of the narrow interpretation of Article 51 and its sacrosanct nature
without putting something else in place to replace the protections that were implicit in
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Article 47 and the accompanying articles is a real failure of responsibility on the part of
the Panel.
JAN WOUTERS :
¶95

Thank you. Thank you very much. Ladies and gentlemen we have, I think, a rich
variety of comments from experts. I would like to thank our distinguished panel
members for the insights they have shared with us.
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